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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - NATIONAL STANDARD
OF CARE ADOPTED IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA. Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C.
1979).
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a national
perspective when it evaluated the standard of care required in a medical
malpractice action. In that case, Richard E. Morrison visited the Oscar B.
Hunter Memorial Laboratories in the District of Columbia to have a ure-
thral smear test performed. The test was administered while the appellant
was in a standing position. Testing stopped after Morrison complained of
feeling faint but resumed a few minutes later when he told the administer-
ing technician that he felt better. Soon thereafter, the appellant fainted
and suffered head injuries which were the basis for the medical malprac-
tice suit filed against the laboratory and its technician in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia.
Expert testimony produced at trial described both the national and local
standards for proper administration of the urethral smear test. According
to the national standard, the preferred patient posture is a sitting or prone
position during administration of the test.' In contrast, evidence indicated
that under the local standard it is acceptable for the patient to be standing.
The court instructed the jury that the appropriate standard of due care is
the local standard, and judgment for the defendant followed.2 On appeal
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the decision was vacated
and a new trial ordered.3 In vacating, the court adopted a national stan-
1. When the urethral smear test is administered, a swab is inserted into the tip of the
penis resulting in blood rushing from the brain, thus often causing the patient to feel faint.
The national standard attempts to alleviate any difficulty by requiring the patient to be sit-
ting or in a prone position. See Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 559 (D.C. 1979)
(Dr. Shargel, a board certified urologist, testified as to the national standard).
2. The jury was instructed that the laboratory and its technician are required to exer-
cise the skill and care employed by similar practitioners in good standing "in the same com-
munity." Id at 560.
3. Id at 565. The appeal was based on the superior court's application of the local
rather than the national standard. Id at 559, 565. Additionally, the trial court addressed
whether the patient assumed the risk when he indicated to the technician that his condition
had improved and that he was prepared to continue with the test. The court of appeals
ruled, however, that it was improper in this case for the jury to consider the question of
assumption of risk because that doctrine requires the patient to know of the danger and
voluntarily to expose himself to it. Id at 565-68. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 68
(4th ed. 1971). The court reasoned that Morrison did not assume the risk when he consented
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dard of care for "board certified physicians, hospitals, medical laborato-
ries, and other health care providers."4
In medical malpractice actions, the applicable standard of care is that
exercised by the average or reasonable practitioner5 in the defendant's
class under the same or similar circumstances.6 Where the national stan-
to resumption of the test but rather relied on the technician's expertise to insure that it was
safe to continue. 407 A.2d at 568.
4. Id at 565. Courts have moved away from the strict locality rule, and the majority
now apply the same or similar locality rule. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309
(10th Cir. 1978) (physician was not a board certified orthopedic surgeon and court applied
same or similar community rule); Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1977); Priest v.
Lindig, 583 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1978) (national board certified specialist held to similar com-
munity standard); Baoust v. Kraut, 377 A.2d 4 (Del. 1977); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747
(Fla. App. 1977) (neurosurgeon held to standard of the average practitioner in the same or
similar community); Conrad v. St. Clair, 599 P.2d 292 (Idaho 1979) (standard of same or like
community applied to physician's postoperative treatment); Chandler v. Neosho Memorial
Hosp., 223 Kan. 1, 574 P.2d 136 (1977) (physicians and hospitals held to same or similar
community standard); Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 564 P.2d 162 (1977) (standard of
same or similar community within the state applied); Anderson v. Moore, 202 Neb. 452, 275
N.W.2d 842 (1979) ("same neighborhood and in similar communities"); Dickens v. Ever-
hart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973) (general practitioner held to similar community
standard); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1973) (psychiatrist held to similar commu-
nity standard); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (physician who was not
a specialist held to standard in same or similar community); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222
S.E.2d 783 (1976) (the court noted that there were sound reasons for abandoning the locality
rule but stated that the legislature should make the change); Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.
Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965) (chiropodist held to similar community standard). In addi-
tion, a similar locality standard has been enacted by some state legislatures. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794 (West Supp. 1980).
However, a number of courts apply the more liberal national standard. See, e.g., Speed v.
State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 908 (Iowa 1976) (locality is one factor to consider); Shilkret v. An-
napolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 200-01, 349 A.2d 245, 253 (1975) (type and
availability of facilities and type of practice are to be considered); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354
Mass. 102, 108-09, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968) (medical resources are one circumstance used
in determining requisite case); Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 597-98, 398 N.Y.S.2d
470, 474-78 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (population and financial resources should be considered); Peder-
son v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78-79, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967) (local practice in com-
munity may be considered); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283-84, 206 N.W.2d 166,
173 (1973) (size and character of community should be considered).
5. There may be a difference between the average and the reasonable practitioner.
'he term "average" suggests that although the performance of half of the country's physi-
cians may be reasonable, it will be considered negligent simply because it falls below the
professional average. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 129 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Priest
v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173, 177 n. II (Alaska 1978).
6. Proof of the recognized standard of care and of the defendant's departure from that
standard are required for a finding of malpractice. See Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674, 677
(D.C. Cir. 1963). Generally, negligence by a medical practitioner must be shown by expert
testimony indicating that the defendant's conduct fell below the applicable standard of due
care. See Smith v. Reitman, 389 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown v. Keaveny, 326
F.2d 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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dard is employed, the criteria are applied without geographic limitation,7
and no territorial restrictions are placed on the availability of experts who
may testify as to whether the applicable standard has been met.' Thus,
while the standard is not geographically limited, a practitioner's location
may be one factor considered in determining the reasonableness of con-
duct.9
The national standard, however, may be criticized for inhibiting innova-
tion by creating the apprehension of potential malpractice action. Re-
cently, for example, there has been much concern over the use of laetrile as
a cancer treatment. If a physician administers laetrile in a community
where its use is lawful and the patient later dies, the physician might then
be deemed negligent."° This result is anamolous since in a national stan-
dard jurisdiction, the physician may be negligent although the use of lae-
trile is medically acceptable in the community where it was used. Thus,
while the national standard is becoming increasingly popular, many courts
continue to adhere to the locality rule.11
7. The national standard, based on national certification, readily available literature,
and common facilities, is restricted by the boundaries of the United States. See Shilkret v.
Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 199, 349 A.2d 245, 252 (1975).
8. See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971). Under the locality rule, courts may
consider practitioners from outside the locality incompetent to testify as to the applicable
standard of care. See, e.g., Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1977) (physician not
allowed to testify about the standard of care in a town 100 miles away). However, where the
community standard is similar to that applied in other jurisdictions, the court may allow
experts representative of those jurisdictions to testify. See Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95,
199 S.E.2d 440 (1973) (although California physician was unfamiliar with standard of par-
ticular North Carolina community, the physician was familiar with the standard in similar
communities). See also Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 335, 564 P.2d 162, 167 (1977)
(expert's familiarity with practice in localities similarly located and of comparable size and
character from a medical viewpoint made him competent to testify). Furthermore, courts
may allow expert testimony where the expert, although unfamiliar with the standard in a
particular locality, is familiar with standard procedure used throughout the country. See
Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 993-95, 158 S.E.2d 159, 168-69 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 200-01, 349
A.2d 245, 253 (1975) (totality of circumstances including availability of facilities should be
considered); Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 597-98, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (population density, territorial expanse, and financial resources should be considered).
10. For a discussion of laetrile and its legal implications, see Note, Laetrile: Individual
Choice For Cancer Patients, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 313 (1978). The article
mentions that laetrile is toxic and could potentially result in a patient's death. Id at 317-18.
Thus, the question may arise whether a physician would be liable for administering the
drug.
11. See, e.g., Parrish v. Spink, 284 Ala. 263, 267, 224 So. 2d 621, 623 (1969) (oral sur-
geon held to degree of care exercised in same general neighborhood); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn,
167 Conn. 609, 616-18, 356 A.2d 887, 891-92 (1975) (same general neighborhood); Lockhart
v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 215-16, 361 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1961) (under certain circumstances
strict locality rule may be relaxed; Lockhart overruled as to specialists in Drault v. Miller,
1980] 1083
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Originally, the locality rule was espoused by nineteenth-century courts
largely to protect rural practitioners.' 2 In Small v. Howard,I3 for example,
a Massachusetts court reasoned that a small country physician was bound
to exercise the skill and care normally used by practitioners in similar lo-
calities. Therefore, this rule clearly expresses the court's concern that rural
practitioners may lack the experience, opportunities, and facilities avail-
able to the urban practitioner.
The locality rule takes two basic forms: the strict locality, or same com-
munity form and the same or similar community form.' 4 Under the for-
mer, performance is measured against the skill and care ordinarily
exercised by practitioners in the same community. The result may be the
creation of an abnormally high or low standard of care. A practitioner
failing to meet the profession's community standard of care may be ab-
solved from liability where practitioners in the same area customarily per-
form below the norm. In addition, persons practicing in a single-physician
community would be effectively immunized from liability for negligence.5
Moreover, plaintiffs may be faced with an insurmountable "conspiracy of
silence"' 6 in attempting to obtain the necessary local expert witnesses for
595 P.2d 1191 (Nev. 1979)); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 163, 509 P.2d 1356, 1358
(1973) (Diplomate of American Board of Surgery held to community standard); Getchell v.
Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 179, 489 P.2d 953, 955 (1971) (reasonable practice in the commu-
nity).
12. For example, in Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870), the court commented:
In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery,
though often possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest elements
of the profession, do not enjoy so great opportunities of daily observation and
practical operations, where the elementary studies are brought into every-day use,
as those have who reside in the metropolitan towns; and, though just as well in-
formed in the elements and literature of their profession, they should not be ex-
pected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical knowledge possessed by
those having greater facilities ...
Id at 63-64. See also Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 169 (1893); Gramm v. Boener, 56
Ind. 497, 500 (1877); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880).
13. 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
14. For cases in which the two forms of the locality rule have been applied, see notes 4
&I Isupra.
15. See Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877). The Gramm court stated that in any
given community there might be few practitioners "all of whom might be quacks, ignorant
pretenders to knowledge not possessed by them, and it would not do to say, that, because
one possessed and exercised as much skill as the others, he could not be chargeable with the
want of reasonable skill." Id at 501. See generally Waltz, The Rise And Gradual Fall Of The
Locality Rule In Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 408, 411 (1968). In the
hypothetical single-physician community or in the community where practitioners do not act
reasonably, the practitioner would be effectively free from liability.
16. See Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Wright, J., dissenting)




The problems associated with the strict locality rule can be partially alle-
viated by expansively interpreting the term "community."' 7 Alternatively,
the same or similar community standard can be used to mitigate some of
the strict locality's more aberrant and anomalous results. Because profes-
sional competence is measured against that exercised by practitioners in
the same or similar community, practitioners may not be absolved from
liability for performing below the norm. Furthermore, since this rule al-
lows practitioners from similar communities to testify as to the applicable
standard, it may alleviate the conspiracy of silence problem.' 8 Although
some of the strict locality problems are corrected by this approach, the
inevitable difficulty of defining the functional boundaries of the similar
community remain. 9 Moreover, the rule has been criticized for providing
a safe harbor unique to the medical profession. Nonetheless, the majority
of courts continue to adhere to the same or similar community rule in spite
of a modem movement toward the national standard.2"
Prior to Morrison v. MacNamara,2" the District of Columbia courts ap-
plied a variety of standards in medical malpractice actions. The strict lo-
cality22 and the same or similar community rules, 23 as well as the standard
malpractice action). See generally Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied" The Silent Medi-
cal Treatment, I VILL. L. REV. 250, 259 (1956); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the
Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 158 (1966). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965). Faced with the "conspiracy of silence," the plaintiff may fail to satisfy
the burden of proof. See note 6 supra.
17. See Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975) (court defined local-
ity to include the whole state of Connecticut).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
19. In Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170, 1173 (6th Cir. 1977), the question of same or
similar community was addressed. There, the court rejected the argument that Duluth, Min-
nesota, and Ironwood, Michigan were the same or similar communities although they were
located only 100 miles apart and referrals from Ironwood to Duluth medical facilities were
regularly made. The court noted that Ironwood was a smaller and distinct community with
its own medical needs. Id See also Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(medical education and training are nationalized); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. at 196 n.5, 349 A.2d at 250 n.5 (courts may consider geographic proximity,
socioeconomic factors, or medical factors in defining similar community).
20. Many courts which still adhere to the strict locality rule for general practitioners
apply the national standard for specialists. See, e.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400,
499 P.2d 156 (1972); Drault v. Miller, 595 P.2d 1191 (Nev. 1979) (court rejected the locality
rule for specialists). The Restatement has adopted the national standard only for specialists.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment d (1965).
21. 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
22. See, e.g., Garfield Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(private hospital held to standard of other hospitals "in the community"); Hohenthal v.
Smith, 114 F.2d 494, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("in the same locality"); Wilson v. Borden, 62
F.2d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ("in the District of Columbia").
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24of the reasonable practitioner, were used. More recently, in Robbins v.
Footer,25 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected geographically limited standards for nationally certified medical
specialists and instead applied the national standard. The federal court
reasoned that the medical profession is national in scope since national
medical educational requirements must be satisfied for certification and
that specialty medical information is easily disseminated nationwide.26
Thus, the fears expressed by the court in Small v. Howard27 are misplaced
in malpractice actions involving specialists.
The Morrison court, however, did not rely on the groundwork laid by
the Robbins court for the abrogation of the locality rule.28 Rather, the
Morrison court accented the potential for inequity since the locality rule
essentially protects the rural practitioner and accordingly has no appropri-
ate foundation in the urban setting. In the District's sophisticated medical
community, many educational and research facilities allow practioners to
give quality treatment. Furthermore, patient care is enhanced by the in-
formation disseminated through medical societies, journals, and consulta-
tions with other qualified practitioners.29 Clearly, the District is not the
isolated community contemplated by nineteenth-century courts that ap-
plied the locality rule.
Moreover, continued use of the locality rule in the District could have
fostered substandard care in the medical profession3" as Morrison demon-
strated.3' Conversely, in some circumstances the locality rule could result
in hardship to the average practitioner by requiring greater care and skill
when a person practices in a community where practitioners routinely ex-
cel.32
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("similar locali-
ties"); Quick v. Thurston, 290 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ("his own or similar locali-
ties").
24. See Harris v. Cafritz Memorial Hosp., 364 A.2d 135, 137 n.2 (D.C. 1976). This
standard was applied without discussion of geographically limited standards.
25. 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. Id at 126-29. While the Robbins court applied the national standard to specialists,
it did not discuss the numerous preceding malpractice cases in the District of Columbia
which had not applied the national standard.
27. 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880).
28. The Morrison court relegated Robbins to a footnote and failed to discuss it. See 407
A.2d at 562 n.5.
29. Id at 562-63. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the
rationale behind the locality rule.
30. See note 15 supra.
31. See note I supra and accompanying text.
32. See Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 334-35, 564 P.2d 162, 166 (1977) (limitation
of the applicable standard to the locality rule removes incentive for improvement).
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Additionally, the national standard of care places medical professionals
on the same level with professionals in other fields in the District of Co-
lumbia.33 In Noble v. Worthy,34 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals held architects to a standard of care commensurate with the average
practitioner in the profession. The court reasoned that persons come to
professionals expecting to receive some minimum level of care. This ex-
pectation, therefore, is reinforced in the medical profession by national
board certification and the ease in obtaining specialty information.
The Morrison court's rejection of the locality rule in the District of Co-
lumbia suggests that the locality rule may be obsolete in modem cities.
Moreover, the change will likely result in an easing of the complications
inherent in malpractice litigation. In particular, the new national standard
will eliminate the burdensome ambiguities of defining a similar locality
and reduce the customary frustrations of locating a suitable local expert
witness.
33. See, e.g., Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C. 1949) (no geographic limits applied in
holding attorney to standard of reasonable duty).
34. 378 A.2d 674, 676 (D.C. 1977).
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